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On the other hand there are many modern cases holding that evidence
obtained by illegal search and seizure is absolutely inadmissible. 24 A. L.
R. 1417. In 1914 the Supreme Court in Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S.
383, held constitutional rights supreme when asserted before trial, and sub-
sequent cases in that court have recognized the constitutional right as tak-
ing precedence over the above mentioned general rule of evidence although
first asserted at the trial. 24 A. L. R. 1417. This view was vigorously
assailed by Professor Wigmore in his above mentioned article, but was
supported in American Bar Association Journal, October, 1922, p. 646, by
Cannor Hall.
Thus there are actually three theories, with many cases to support each,
instead of "an almost universal rule"; one holding the evidence admissible
despite illegal search and seizure, another holding such evidence absolutely
inadmissible, and the third requiring an objection made before trial (24
A. L. R. 1421), in accord with the rule of Hantz v. State, supra.
But this last rule has been quite ingeniously ignored by the Supreme
Court of Indiana. In fact, frequently a reversal has been ordered where
the objection to the evidence was firsf made at the trial. Thompson v.
State, 198 Ind. 496; Conner v. State, 167 N. E. 545; Walker v. State, 142
N. E. 16. The second rule was apparently followed in Callender v. State,
193 Ind. 91, 138 N. E. 817, which flatly held that "property seized under an
invalid search warrant is inadmissible."
On the other hand, Hantz v. State, supra, has never been expressly over-
ruled. In the case in question, the trial came some eleven months after
the search and arrest. Applying the rule of the Appellate Court, the right
to object clearly was lost, but the Supreme Court chose to add this case to
those that decided contra to the rule without any mention of its existence.
Martin, J., is decidedly correct in stating that the profession and the
Appellate Court are entitled to a definite settlement of the quesion by the
Supreme Court. P. J. D.
SEDUCTION-WHAT CONsTiTUTEs.-There was evidence of D's having
sought the society of P frequently; of his protestation of love for her; of
his kindness and courtesy; of his discussing his business and personal
affairs with her; of his statement to her that he desired to get a divorce
and marry her; and of a course of conduct calculated to win P's confidence
and affection and to bring about the seduction claimed. At the time of
yielding by the P she knew that D was a married man. Held, for P, that
the knowledge that D was married does not preclude recovery, and that a
promise of marriage is not a necessary element in seduction. Burke v.
Middlesworth, Appellate Court of Indiana, January 29, 1931; 174 N. E. 432.
Seduction may create both civil and criminal liability. In Indiana any
male person is guilty of the crime of seduction who, under promise of
marriage, shall have illicit carnal intercourse with any female of good
repute for chastity, under the age of twenty-one. Burns Annotated Ind.
Stat., 1926, Sec. 2553. Since the principal case is a suit for damages the
note will be confined to the civil phase.
The word "seduction" is of Latin derivation, and signifies a leading
astray. Pertman v. State, 29 Tex. App. 454, 16 S. W. 97. It has been
defined as the act of a man in enticing a woman of previous chaste charac-
RECENT CASE NOTES
ter to have unlawful intercourse with him by means of persuasion, solicita-
tion, promise, bribes, or other means. Robinson v. Powers, 129 Ind. 480;
Greenman v. O'Riley, 144 Mich. 534; Marshal v. Taylor, 98 Cal. 55; Crog-
han v. State, 22 Wis. 424. The essential element of a right of action for
seduction is the act of seduction itself, which can only be accomplished by
persuasion, flattery, deceit, false promises, or other artifices on the part of
the seducer, whereby the female is induced to yield up her virtue. Marshall
v. Taylor, supra; Smith v. Richards, 29 Conn. 232; Johnson v. Holliday,
79 Ind. 151; Baird v. Bachner, 72 Iowa 318; Freon v. Henkle, 14 Ore. 494;
Bradshaw v. Jones, 103 Tenn. 331. Illicit or unlawful intercourse does not
of itself constitute seduction. Bill v. Rinker, 29 Ind. 267, holding that if
an unmarried man solicits sexual intercourse with an unmarried female,
and she yields through the promptings of her own lascivious and lecherous
desires, it is not seduction, such as will entitle her to recover damages in
her own right, although a child be begotten by the connections. Or if it
appears that P agreed to yield because of a mercenary consideration, she
cannot recover. Wilson v. Evsworth, 85 Ind. 399. The principal case
decides very little about seduction- other than that a promise of marriage is
not necessary, and that the D may be guilty of seduction even though the
P knows that he is married. Though a promise of marriage is one of the
means often resorted to by the seducer to accomplish his purpose, such
promise is not a necessary element in seduction. Ireland v. Emmerson,
93 Ind. 1; Germill v. Brown, 25 Ind. App. 6; Hollock v. Kinney, 91 Mich.
57; Bradshaw v. Jones, 103 Tenn. 331. Owing to the fact that a promise
of marriage is unnecessary, a married man may be guilty of seduction even
though the woman knew that he was married. Marshall v. Taylor, supra.
However, a promise of marriage may constitute the entirement or persua-
sion on which the action is based. Hawk v. Harris, 112 Iowa 543; Wood v.
Ludberth, 111 N. E. 215. The courts generally hold that the female must
be chaste at the time of the seduction in order for her to recover. Green-
man v. O'Riley, 114 Mich. 534; Patterson v. Hayden, 17 Ore. 238. But it
will be presumed that a female was chaste at the time of the alleged seduc-
tion until the contrary is shown by evidence. Robinson v. Powers, 129 Ind.
480; Hodges v. Bales, 102 Ind. 494. If she has been previously unchaste
there must have been a reformation prior to the act of D. Patterson v.
Hayden, supra; Robinson v. Powers, supra; Gemmill v. Brown, supra. On
the other hand there is some authority for the position that the woman
need not be chaste at the time of the alleged seduction. Smith v. Milburn,
17 Iowa 30; Lane v. Mosoner, 6 Baxt (Tenn.) 24. It has been stated in
a number of instances that if sexual intercourse is accomplished by force
alone, under circumstances which constitute the offense of rape, while a
civil action to recover damages lies, yet it properly cannot be termed an
action for seduction. Lee v. Hefley, 21 Ind. 101; Johnson v. Holliday, 79
Ind. 151; DeHaven v. Helvie, 126 Ind. 82; Cole v. Hubble, 26 Ont. Rep.
279. But in an action under a statute giving a female a right of action
for her own seduction, proof that the intercourse was accomplished by
force or that the acts complained of constituted rape is no defense. Mar-
shall v. Taylor, supra; Hodges v. Bales, 102 Ind. 494; Watson v. Watson,
53 Mich. 168. In Marshall v. Taylor, supra, it was held that proof that the
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intercourse was accomplished by force, instead of being a defense, in part
aggravates the injury and furnishes a ground for exemplary damages.
At common law a seduced female had no cause of action against her
seducer. Not only because she was a party to the wrongful act, but also
because loss of service was indispensable to a right of recovery, and no one
except those entitled to the services of the female could maintain an action
for the seduction. The right of action was based solely upon the relation
of master and servant. Welsund v. Sehuller, 98 Minn. 425; Paul v. Frazier,
3 Mass. 11; Watson v. Watson, supra; Hamilton v. Lormazx, 26 Barb. 615;
Conlon v. Cassady, 17 R. I. 518. A parent, guardian, or other person
standing in loco parentis has a right of action at common law against one
who seduces his daughter under certain circumstances. Lerry v. Hutchin-
son, L. R. 3 Q. B. 599; Harper v., Tuffkin, 7 B, and C. 387; Rist v. Fauz,
4 B. and S. 409; Dean v. Peel, 5 East 45. To enable him to maintain the
action some of the earlier English cases held that some actual service
must be shown to exist, although it was sufficient if of the slightest or
most trivial nature, this being absolutely essential to establish the relation
of master and servant, which was the foundation of the action. Dean V.
Peel, supra. The rule has been relaxed, however, and at the present time,
in both England and in the United States, it is only necessary to show
either the actual or constructive relation of master and servant. The
action is based on the legal right of the parent to command the services
of the child. Balton v. Miller, 6 Ind. 262; Greenwood v. Greenwood, 28 Ind.
369; Tucker v. Steiler, 89 Ill. 545; White v. Willis, 31 N. Y. 405; Wahry v.
Hoffmnan, 86 Pa. St. 358; Teny v. Hutchinson, L. R. 3 Q. B. 602. But where
the daughter is of full age, being emancipated from parental authority,
some kind of service must be shown, although it may be slight or trivial, to
give the parent the right to maintain the action. Badgley v. Decker, 44
Barb. 577; Kendrick v. McCrary, 11 Ga. 603; Kening v. Ilster, 2 Houst.
(Del.) 66; Ball v. Bruce, 21 Ill. 161. Loss of service as a condition prece-
dent to the right to recover has been changed in some states. Felkner v.
Scarlet, 29 Ind. 154; Anthony v. Norton, 60 Kan. 341; Standt v. Shepherd,
73 Mich. 588; Schmit v. Mitchell, 59 Minn. 251. In Indiana the right of a
woman to sue for her own seduction is governed by Sec. 27 of Burns Anno-
tated Ind. Statutes, 1926, which provides that any unmarried female may
prosecute, as P., on action for her own seduction, and may recover therein
such damages as may be assessed in her favor. But the complaint must
allege that the P is unmarried. Thompson v. Young, 61 Ind. 599; Galvin v.
Cronch, 65 Ind. 56. C. E. B.
